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Summary
President Bush and Thai Prime Minister Thaskin on October 19, 2003 agreed
to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). The Bush Administration notified
Congress on February 12, 2004 that it intends to begin the negotiations, prompting
a 90-day consultation period with Congress and the private sector.  Three negotiating
rounds have taken place to date, the most recent April 4-8, 2005, in Thailand.  Given
a number of politically sensitive issues, as well as limited support for the FTA among
some Thai businessmen, some observers predict the negotiations could prove
difficult to complete this year.  
In the notification letter sent to the congressional leadership, U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick put forth an array of commercial and foreign policy
gains that could be derived from the agreement.  The letter states that an FTA would
be particularly beneficial to U.S. agricultural producers who have urged the
administration to move forward, as well as to U.S. companies exporting goods and
services to Thailand and investing there.  Mr. Zoellick also alluded to sensitive issues
that will need to be addressed: trade in automobiles, protection of intellectual
property rights, and labor and environmental standards.
As in most FTA negotiations, competing viewpoints on the desirability and
nature of the provisions of the agreement are likely.  As background for
congressional oversight of the negotiations, this report examines Thailand’s economy
and trade orientation, discusses the scope and significance of the U.S.-Thai
commercial relationship, and summarizes key negotiating issues.  
Thailand’s economy has recovered strongly from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
In 2004 the Thai economy grew at 5.2% in real terms and yielded a per capita income
of $2,490.  With around 20% of Thai exports destined for the U.S. market, the United
States is Thailand’s largest export market. In 2003, Thailand was the United States’
23rd largest export market ($5.8 billion) and its 16th largest supplier of imports ($15.2
billion). 
Countries that form FTAs agree at a minimum to phase out or reduce tariff and
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on mutual trade in order to enhance market access between
the trading partners.  The U.S.-Thailand FTA is expected to be comprehensive,
seeking to liberalize trade in goods, agriculture, services, and investment, as well as
intellectual  property rights. Other issues such as government procurement,
competition policy,  environment and labor standards, and customs procedures are
also likely to be on the negotiating table. 
The U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations are of interest to Congress because (1) an
agreement would require passage of implementing legislation to go into effect; (2)
an agreement could increase U.S. exports of goods, services, and investment, with
particular benefits for agricultural exports; and (3) an agreement could increase
competition for U.S. import-competing industries such as textiles and apparel and
light trucks, thereby raising the issue of job losses. This report will be updated as
events warrant. 
Contents
Why a U.S.-Thailand FTA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Thailand’s Economy and Trade Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
U.S.-Thailand Commercial Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Issues in the FTA Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Trade in Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Agricultural Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Trade in Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congress and the U.S.-Thailand FTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1.  Selected Economic Indicators for Thailand’s Economy:  1996-2003 . . 4
Table 2.  Thailand’s Major Trading Partners: 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 3.  U.S. Merchandise Trade with Thailand: 1997-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A.  U.S. Imports from Thailand, Customs Value by 
Two-Digit Harmonized System Commodity Codes, 2001-2003 . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix B.  U.S. Exports to Thailand by Two-Digit 
Harmonized System Commodity Codes, 2001-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1 Inside U.S. Trade, “USTR Zoellick Notifies Congress of Intent To Negotiate Free Trade
Pact with Thailand,” February 19, 2004.
U.S.- Thailand 
Free Trade Agreement Negotiations
Why a U.S.-Thailand FTA?
 
The Bush Administration  notified Congress on February 12, 2004 that it intends
to begin free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with Thailand.  This notification,
which follows an October 19, 2003 announcement by President Bush and Thai Prime
Minister Thaskin of their agreement to launch negotiations, allows for talks to begin
within 90 days or by mid-May 2004, after required consultations with Congress. 
Two negotiating sessions took place in 2004, and a third was held April 4-8, 2005 in
Thailand.  The next negotiating session is  expected to be scheduled for July 2005.
In the notification letter sent to the Speaker of the House and the Senate
Majority Leader, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick put forth an array of
potential commercial and foreign policy gains that could be derived from the
agreement.  At the same time, Mr. Zoellick alluded to sensitive issues that require
attention: trade in automobiles, protection of intellectual property rights, and labor
and environmental standards.1
Zoellick’s letter states that an FTA would be particularly beneficial to U.S.
agricultural producers who have urged the administration to move forward, as well
as to U.S. companies exporting industrial goods and services. For agricultural
producers, by eliminating or reducing Thailand’s high tariffs and other barriers, the
FTA offers the opportunity to significantly increase export sales to Thailand.  In
2003, Thailand was the 16th largest market for U.S. farm exports.
The administration also argued that an FTA would help boost U.S. exports of
goods and services in sectors such as information technology, telecommunications,
financial services, audiovisual, automotive, and medical equipment.  In 2003, U.S.
companies exported to Thailand $5.8 billion in goods and over $1 billion in services.
Maintaining preferential access for U.S. investors in Thailand is also a top priority
for U.S. business.  Given that  Thailand is a relatively small economy compared to
the United States (1/100th “the size”), the agreement by itself will have limited
effects on the overall U.S. economy.  
From the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy interests, the Administration views
the proposed FTA as strengthening cooperation with Thailand in bilateral, regional,
and multilateral fora.  Bilaterally, the FTA is seen as strengthening Thailand’s
position as a key military ally, particularly in the war on terrorism.  Regionally, the
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FTA is viewed as advancing President Bush’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative
(EAI).  The goal of the EAI is to negotiate a network of bilateral trade agreements
with the 10 members of ASEAN.  Multilaterally, Thailand plays a key leadership role
in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  An FTA could encourage Thailand to
actively cooperate with the United States in supporting multilateral trade negotiations
under the aegis of the Doha Development Agenda, particularly in the area of
agricultural liberalization. 
As for Thailand, similar broad economic and political calculations explain its
interest in an FTA.  In economic terms, Thailand is very concerned that its exports
to the United States have been losing market share in recent years to countries such
as Mexico and China. By eliminating U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers to Thai
exports, an FTA could help increase the competitiveness and market share of Thai
products in the U.S. market. Thailand also does not want to be excluded from FTA
benefits the U.S. has negotiated with other countries, particularly the potential of an
FTA to increase U.S. investment in Thailand. Modernization of the services economy
and diffusion of higher levels of technology, know-how, and labor management skills
are essential for the Thai economy to advance beyond the  competition from lower-
wage emerging market economies such as China, Vietnam, and Laos.  In addition,
a closer political and economic relationship with the United States could provide
Thailand with more leverage to play a larger role in Southeast Asia.
General opposition to the FTA in both countries is expected from workers and
companies in import-competing industries that bear the brunt  of the adjustment costs
of a trade agreement. Despite the welfare gains to society as a whole (e.g. more
efficient resource allocation, lower priced imports, and greater selection of goods),
those industries subject to increased competition face additional pressure to cut costs,
wages, and prices.  Some companies may not be able to withstand these pressure and
may be forced out of business, accompanied by a loss of jobs. Under these
circumstances, certain stakeholders, as a matter of self-interest, may oppose trade
agreements that accelerate competition and structural changes in an economy.
Specific opposition in Thailand may arise from concerns in the agricultural and
services sectors.  Given that close to 50 percent of the Thai labor force is employed
in agriculture, liberalization of this sector is likely to be contentious.  Similarly, in
a number of services sectors, Thai companies may feel they are at a competitive
disadvantage in opening up to U.S. competitors. Thailand’s banking and financial
services industry, in particular, is wary of further liberalization after the financial
crisis of 1997.  Thai stakeholders are also particularly wary, given the high incidence
of AIDS infections, in U.S. efforts to secure data exclusivity for patented
pharmaceuticals.  In addition, a number of Thai business interests reportedly are
concerned over potential U.S. investment in newly privatized companies such as the
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand and the Mass Rapid Transit Authority.
Opposition in the United States may arise from groups concerned about the
impact of the trade agreement on labor and environmental standards.  Often joined
by anti-globalization activists, these interest groups question whether trade
agreements enhance the social welfare of participating countries.  Other issues such
as transparency in government decision-making,  human rights, and freedom of the
press could also be raised.   In addition, increased market access for Thai agricultural
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2 For additional information on the Asian financial crisis, see  CRS Report 98-434, The
Asian (Global?) Financial Crisis, the IMF, and Japan: Economic Issues, by Dick K. Nanto;
and CRS Report RL30517, Asian Financial Crisis and Recovery: Implications for U.S.
Interests, by Richard Cronin.
3 Prior to the crisis, the Thai government attempted to peg its currency (the Baht) to the U.S.
dollar (at around 25 Baht to the dollar).  However, speculative pressures on the Baht forced
the government to attempt to maintain the peg through high interest rates and, ultimately,
to use foreign exchange reserves to prop up the currency.  Eventually, however, the
government nearly ran out of foreign exchange reserves and was forced to abandon the
currency peg by allowing the currency to float in international markets.  This led the Baht
to depreciate sharply (at one point reaching 56 Baht to the dollar in January 1998) and
forced the Thai government to seek international financial assistance.
4 PPP measurements attempt to convert foreign currencies into U.S. dollars based on the
actual purchasing power of such currency (based on surveys of the prices of various goods
and services) in each respective country.  They thus give a more accurate measurement of
the size of a country’s economy and living standards relative to those in the United States.
products such as rice and sugar, as well as a reduction of the 25% U.S. tariff on
lightweight pick-up trucks, is also likely to be controversial.
In short,  competing viewpoints can be expected on the desirability of an FTA.
As in most FTAs that the United States has negotiated,  the distribution of gains and
losses would depend on the details of the provisions.
As background for congressional oversight, this report examines Thailand’s
economy and trade orientation, the scope and significance of the U.S.-Thai
commercial relationship, and the likely top issues in the negotiations.  The report
concludes with a short summary of the Congressional role and interest in the FTA.
Thailand’s Economy and Trade Orientation
Thailand continues to recover from the debilitating effects of the Asian financial
crisis, which hit the Thai economy in July 1997 and subsequently affected several
other East Asian economies.2 The economic crisis in Thailand was characterized by
a significant depreciation of the Baht (which led to a depletion of nearly all of
Thailand’s foreign exchange reserves),3 a decline in the stock market, and a sharp
decline of property prices.  The combination of these shocks led to a major economic
downturn.  Ten years prior to the 1997 crisis, Thailand had been one of the world’s
fastest growing economies, fueled in large part by exports.  After averaging 8.6%
annual growth between 1990 and 1996, Thailand’s real gross domestic product
(GDP) fell by 1.4% in 1997 and then declined by 10.3% in 1998 (see Table 1).
Trade also suffered: in 1998, exports fell by 6.7% and imports plunged by 33.0% (in
dollar terms) over 1997 levels.  The unemployment rate rose from 3.2% in 1997 to
7.3% in 1998.  In addition, Thailand’s per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity
(PPP) basis, a common measurement of a nation’s living standards, plummeted  by
12%, from $6,468 to $5,7094  
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5 The sharp depreciation of the Baht that occurred in 1997 significantly increased the debt
burden for these institutions as it took more Baht to purchase dollars to make debt payments.
Many such institutions were unable to make their payments and subsequently went
bankrupt.
Table 1.  Selected Economic Indicators for Thailand’s Economy: 
1996-2003
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Average Exchange
Rate (Baht  per
U.S.$)
25 31 41 38 40 44 43 48
Real GDP Growth
(%)
5.9 -1.4 -10.3 4.4 4.8 2.1 4.8 6.2
GDP ($billions ) 182 151 112 123 123 116 127 133
GDP (billions
($PPP)* 
397 391 349 370 389 404 431 464
Per Capita GDP
($PPP)*
6,623 6,468 5,709 5,981 6,229 6,460 6,850 7,250
Exports ($billions) 56.0 58.4 54.5 58.5 69.8 65.4 68.8 77.8
Imports ($billions) 72.2 63.3 42.4 49.9 62.2 61.8 64.2 64.9
Annual FDI flows
($billions)
2.3 3.9 7.3 6.2 3.4 3.8 3.3 2.2
Public Debt as a %
of GDP (%)




3.5 3.2 7.3 6.3 5.8 5.0 3.7 3.4
**PPP data are measurements of  foreign data in national currencies converted into U.S. dollars based
on a comparable level of purchasing power these data would have in the United States.  Prices for
goods and services are generally lower in Thailand than in the United States, and hence, the PPP
measurement of Thailand’s GDP is significantly higher than GDP data expressed in nominal U.S.
dollars.
 
Sources:  Thailand’s Customs Department, Bank of Thailand, and the Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU). 
Thailand’s economy was stabilized by a $17.2 billion loan from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), although a number of major Thai banks and corporations were
forced into bankruptcy, largely because much of their short-term debt was in U.S.
dollars.5  Real GDP grew by 4.4% in 1999 and by 4.8% in 2000, but slowed to 2.1%
in 2001. Public dissatisfaction in Thailand with  government handling of economic
restructuring brought about the election of a new coalition government in 2001
(headed by the Thai Rak Thai Party) with Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister.  He
launched a series of economic initiatives designed to stabilize the economy, boost
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6  Thailand’s exports grew by about 17% in 2003. 
7 One estimate puts Thailand’s non-performing corporate loans at $42.5 billion, equal to
34% of GDP.  See, “Thailand’s Debt Undertow, Businessweek,” September 23, 2002.
8  World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review: Thailand,” WT/TPR/S/123, October
15, 2003, p.8 [hereafter cited as the WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand].
9  WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand, pp. 11-12. 
domestic demand, encourage the growth of small and medium-sized businesses, and
improve rural incomes.  
Thailand’s economy has generally experienced strong growth over the past two
years, and many analysts are projecting strong growth in the near term.  Real GDP
increased by 4.8% in 2002.  Although the Thai economy (especially the tourist
sector) was negatively affected by the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) in early 2003, it quickly recovered and grew at a robust 6.7% in
real terms for the full year, boosted in part by strong export growth and consumer
spending.6   Private forecasters project that the Thai economy will grow by 6.9% in
2004 and by 5.6% in 2005. 
Despite optimistic projections for the Thai economy over the next few years,
many economists remain concerned about the relatively slow pace of banking
reforms and the restructuring of non-performing loans, which could potentially spark
another financial crisis in Thailand.7  While Thailand’s public debt fell sharply in
2003, it remains high by international standards. 
Thailand’s economy is heavily dependent on international trade.  The shares of
exports and imports in GDP have each risen to over 50%, compared with around
40% in 1997.  Manufactured goods account for about 75% of Thailand’s exports and
imports.  The largest export items include office machines and telecommunications
equipment (25% in 2001), other consumer goods (10%), textiles and clothing (8%)
and other semi-manufactures (8%).  Agricultural products account for about 18% of
Thai exports. The largest categories of Thai imports are machines and
telecommunications equipment (22%) and non-electrical machinery (10%).
Agricultural imports account for just under 8% of total imports.8 
Thailand’s top trading partners in 2003 were Japan, the United States, the
European Union (EU), and China (see Table 2).  With around 17.0% of Thai exports
destined for the U.S. market, the United States is Thailand’s largest export market.
On the import side, the United States, with an import share of  9.5%, is the third
largest supplier after Japan and the European Union.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important source of employment and new
technologies and processes. The cumulative level of FDI in Thailand at the end of
2003 was about $31 billion. Portfolio investment in Thailand is also important, with
an estimated $17 billion in 2001.  Japan is the largest foreign investor in Thailand,
followed by the United States.  Most FDI inflows are in manufacturing and services.
Thailand has virtually no FDI in agriculture.9
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Annual FDI flows to Thailand have been relatively flat over the past few years,
and in 2003, FDI in Thailand declined by more than half, caused in part by a shift in
FDI to China. 
Table 2.  Thailand’s Major Trading Partners: 2003
($ billions)
Total Trade Exports Imports TradeBalance
Japan 29.5 11.4 18.1 -6.7
United States 20.7 13.6 7.1 6.5
European
Union
19.3 11.8 7.5 4.3
China 11.7 5.7 6.0 -0.3
Singapore 9.0 5.8 3.2 2.6
Thailand’s
World Trade
155.2 80.2 75.0 5.2
Source: Bank of Thailand.
Thailand, as a member of the WTO, supports multilateral trade liberalization.
As a member of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Thailand
is also committed to “open regionalism” as a means of achieving free and open trade
and investment by 2020.  As a party to the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Thailand also engages in regional trade liberalization and since 2002 has
actively negotiated a network of preferential trading arrangements with countries
such as Australia, Bahrain, China, and India. While the provisions of these
agreements vary considerably from one to the other, none are expected to be as
comprehensive as the planned U.S.-Thailand FTA.  Relying on an “early harvest”
mechanism, Thailand and China, for example, agreed to tariff reductions on fruits
and vegetables, but don’t expect a full FTA to enter into force until 2010.  
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10 American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, Press Release, October 22, 2003.
11 In October 2003, Ford Motor Company and its affiliate, Mazda Motor Company,
announced plans to invest $500 million in Thailand to boost production of its current auto
joint venture, Auto Alliance Thailand.  This would be in addition to the $500 million the
companies initially invested  in 1995.  Source, Automotive Intelligence News, October 15,
2003. 
12 Major U.S. imports from Thailand include  include clothing and apparel, office machines
and parts (i.e., computer equipment), and telecommunications and sound and reproducing
apparatus and equipment.  Major U.S. exports to Thailand include electrical machinery and
parts, transport equipment (mainly aircraft), and office machines and parts.
U.S.-Thailand Commercial Relations
The United States and Thailand maintain extensive commercial ties.  Thailand
affords the United States preferential treatment vis-a-vis other countries for certain
types of investment under the U.S.-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic
Relations of 1966.  The American Chamber of Commerce estimates that the United
States is the second largest foreign investor in Thailand (after Japan), with
cumulative investment at $20 billion.  U.S.-invested firms in Thailand employ over
200,000 Thai nationals.10  Major sectors for U.S. FDI in Thailand include petroleum,
banking, electronics, and the automotive industry.  In recent years, U.S. auto
companies have invested heavily in Thailand.11
In 2003, Thailand was the United States’ 23rd largest export market ($5.8
billion) and its 15th largest supplier of imports ($15.1 billion). U.S. exports to
Thailand increased by 20.2% (over 2002 levels), while U.S. imports from Thailand
rose by  2.6% to (see table 3).  However, while imports from Thailand were 17.5%
higher than 1997 levels, U.S. exports to Thailand in 2003 were 20.6% lower than
they were in 1997.12   
Table 3.  U.S. Merchandise Trade with Thailand: 1997-2003
($millions)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
U.S. Exports 7,357 5,233 4,984 6,643 5,995 4,859 5,842
U.S. Imports 12,595 13,434 14,324 16,389 14,729 14,799 15,181
U.S. Trade Balance -5,238 -8,201 -9,340 -9,747 -8,733 -9,940 -7,336
Source:  U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb.
Top U.S. exports to Thailand in 2003 were electrical machinery (23% of the
total), machinery (19%), aircraft (13%), optical and medical equipment (4%) and
miscellaneous grains and fruit (3%).  Top U.S. imports from Thailand in 2003
included electrical machinery (22%), machinery 16%), precious stones (7%), knit
apparel (6%), woven apparel 6%),  prepared meat and fish (5%), and rubber (5%).
(See Appendix A and B for a detailed commodity breakdown of U.S. exports and
imports to Thailand). 
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15, 2004.  
14 Inside U.S. Trade, “Countries Impacted by Tsunami Push for Trade Benefits from U.S.,”
January 21, 2005.
Thai-U.S. economic relations continue to deepen, as Thailand reforms its
economy and lowers its trade barriers.  Still, a number of contentious issues persist.
On the Thai side, government officials have expressed disappointment with the
United States for failing to take a more active role in rescuing the Thai economy
during the serious economic crisis in 1997.  More recently, Thai officials have
sharply criticized U.S. agricultural policies, especially the farm bill that was enacted
in 2002 (The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L.107-171), arguing
that it heavily subsidizes U.S. farmers, giving  them  an unfair competitive advantage
over Thai  farmers, especially in regard to rice.  Thai officials further argue that the
farm bill has undermined efforts in the WTO for more liberalized trade in agricultural
products.  Thailand has participated in  two WTO dispute resolution cases against the
United States: U.S. anti-dumping subsidy offsets (the “Byrd Amendment”), and U.S.
restrictions on shrimp imports (that were in place in order to protect sea turtles).
More recently, Thai officials are concerned about a pending U.S. antidumping
investigation alleging that producers in Thailand and five other countries are selling
shrimp in U.S. markets below their cost of production.13
As a result of major damage incurred from the December 2004 tsunami, Thai
officials have lobbied U.S. officials for new preferential market access provisions,
including relief from antidumping orders.  Thai efforts reportedly are focusing on
gaining  more favorable treatment for canned tuna and crabmeat, products that are the
chief exports of the Thai provinces damaged by the tsunami.14
Although the United States has not filed any cases against Thailand in the WTO,
it has  raised a number of issues with Thailand over its trade regime.  The most
prominent complaints include high trade barriers (especially on  agricultural
products, automobiles, alcoholic beverages, and electronic products), inadequate
protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), and  non-transparent customs
rules and procedures. 
Issues in the FTA Negotiations
Countries that form FTAs agree at a minimum to phase out tariff and non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) on mutual trade in goods in order to enhance market access between
trading partners. Most U.S. FTAs, including NAFTA and agreements with Chile and
Singapore, are more comprehensive.  Because any U.S.- Thailand FTA is likely to
be based on the Singapore model, no sector, product, or functional issue can expect
to be excluded from the liberalization process. This approach is favored by many
Members of Congress.  As a result, the agreement is likely  to cover trade in goods
and services, agriculture,  investment, and intellectual property rights, as well as other
issues such as government procurement, competition policy, and customs procedures.
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15  WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand, p.73.
16  Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), “Impact of Thailand- U.S. Free Trade
Agreement,” December 2003, 132pp. This study was jointly funded by the Thailand-U.S.
Business Council [based in Bangkok], the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand,
and the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council.  The study is available on the US - ASEAN
Business Council: [http://us-asean.org/us-thai-fta/USTFTA-TDRIstudy.pdf]  Hereafter, this
report is referred to as the TDRI study.  
Trade in Goods 
Tariffs are the major  barrier to liberalized trade in goods. Thailand’s reliance
on import licensing, opaque customs procedures, and excise taxes are also likely to
be issues.
Thailand’s simple average applied tariff rate of about 13% for non-agricultural
imports provides a relatively high level of protection.15  Many Thai tariff rates are
much higher than the average and tend to be applied to imports competing with
locally produced products.  These include tariffs on autos and auto parts, alcoholic
beverages, fabrics, footwear and headgear, and some electrical appliances. For
example, the tariff on passenger cars and sport utility vehicles is 80%, the tariff on
motorcycles 60%, and the tariff on completely knocked down (CKD) auto kits 33%.
Tariffs on fabrics range from 25%-40%.  
Beyond cuts in tariffs, market access for  U.S. goods could be improved by
reducing excessive paperwork and  and undue processing delays in Thai customs
procedures. In addition, import licensing requirements on various items remains
opaque and can sometimes serve as a quantitative restriction.  
U.S. tariffs imposed on Thai non-agricultural exports are relatively low,
averaging around 2-3%, but U.S. tariffs on some items such as textiles and apparel
and light trucks are much higher. Thai concerns may also focus  on U.S. trade remedy
measures, such as  use of antidumping and countervailing duty procedures to protect
U.S. industry.
Agricultural Trade
The United States and Thailand are important trading partners in agricultural
products, but the U.S. market is more important for Thailand than the Thai  market
is for U.S. exporters.  The United States is the second largest market for Thai
agricultural exports and Thailand is the fourth largest supplier of U.S. agricultural
imports. At the same time, even though the United States has been the largest
supplier of Thailand’s agricultural imports,  Thailand ranks only as the 16th largest
market for U.S. agricultural exports.16
The total value of bilateral farm trade was about $1.2 billion in 2002 with the
U.S. running a $377 million deficit. The major Thai exports to the United States are
processed seafood, frozen shrimp, rubber, rice, tapioca, sugar, and fruits and
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19  TDRI Study, p. 55.
20  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2002 National Trade Barriers Report, p. 373.
21  BNA, International Trade Reporter, “Thai Minister Calls on United States To Resist
Special Interests in FTA Talks,” April 1, 2004.
22   Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2002 National Trade Barriers Report, p. 373.
vegetables. Major Thai imports from the U.S. are oil seeds, cotton, cereals (especially
wheat), soybean oil and cake.17
Thai-U.S. agricultural trade is more restricted than trade in manufactured goods.
Both countries impose higher tariffs on agricultural products than on manufactured
goods. The Thai average MFN applied tariff on agricultural products is about 24
percent compared to about 7% for the United States.18
More than 43% of the Thai  tariff lines for agricultural  products have applied
rates exceeding 20%, compared to only 1.3% of the U.S. tariff lines. Consumer-
ready products, meats, fresh fruits and vegetables face tariffs ranging from 40-60%.
Excise taxes and surcharges, licensing fees, and labeling and certification standards
can further boost the tax burden considerably.19 
U.S. fruit growers estimate lost sales of up to $25 million annually from the
combined effect of Thailand’s high tariffs and surcharge.20 Other U.S. exports that
could benefit from liberalization include meat and dairy products, sugar, alcoholic
beverages, and tobacco. U.S. tariff rates that Thailand may want to see reduced
include vegetables and fruits with tariff rates exceeding 10%, pineapples with  a tariff
rate of 29%, and fish and fish products with a tariff rate of 26%.  Thailand, which is
the world’s third largest producer of sugar, will also likely seek substantial
liberalization of the U.S. sugar quotas.21
Since agricultural barriers are higher than non-agricultural barriers,
liberalization  could boost trade more in agricultural products than in manufactured
goods. U.S. farm groups estimate that potential U.S. agricultural  exports to Thailand
could increase by around $300 million annually if Thailand’s tariffs and other trade-
distorting measures were substantially reduced.22  Similar large increases in Thai
agricultural exports to the United States can be expected if substantial liberalization
occurs.
Intellectual Property Rights
Deficiencies in Thai protection of intellectual property (patents, copyrights, and
trademarks) have been a longstanding U.S. concern. The USTR’s 2003 “Special 301”
report  noted that Thailand had recently taken a number of measures to improve IPR
protection, but stated that the United States was concerned with the “explosion of
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copyright piracy within its borders.”23  The International Intellectual Property Rights
Alliance (IIPA) estimates that IPR piracy in Thailand cost U.S. firms $160 million
in 2002.24
While Thailand has taken positive steps to curtail the open sale of pirated  media
products (video, audio, and software), U.S. IPR stakeholders maintain that it has not
adopted a rigorous regime to crack down on pirated optical disc production or its
export.  They  argue that copyright and optical media legislation pending in the Thai
parliament contain particular deficiencies.  U.S. manufacturers are pushing for an
amendment that would require an optical disc facility to prove its copyright
authorization to receive a production license.25
U.S. IPR stakeholders lobbied hard to see Thailand make more progress on the
pending legislation before the FTA negotiations were formally announced. In
deference to these concerns, U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick, in announcing the
intention to begin negotiations, recognized their  “... concerns about the deficiencies
in Thailand’s protection of intellectual property and in its customs regime.
Addressing these issues, as well as other areas such as strengthening measures
against the production of illegal optical discs, will be essential for the successful
conclusion of these negotiations.”26  
Trade in Services
Services such as commerce (wholesale and retail trade), transportation,
telecommunications, and finance account for a growing share of economic activity
in Thailand.  In 2002, services accounted for about 55% of GDP and about 40% of
employment.  A large share of foreign investment goes into services, especially in
finance and retail trade.27
U.S. negotiating objectives are likely to include improvements in access for U.S.
providers of financial, telecommunications, and professional services, and other
sectors.  Liberalization of these sectors is likely to be accompanied by improvements
in Thailand’s regulatory environment, as well as capacity to oversee and insure
effective competition.  
In pursuing these objectives, U.S. negotiators are likely to insist on according
greater market access across each other’s entire services sector, subject to a few
exceptions that must be in writing. This so-called negative list approach was used in
the Singapore FTA and is supported by many Members of Congress. Exceptions in
the Singapore agreement deal with sectors that usually require government
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certification or licenses (lawyers, accountants) involve government institutions
(airports, provision of social security, public hospitals, government corporations), or
involve national policy (atomic energy).28
Major financial institutions in Thailand include the central bank, commercial
banks, finance companies, securities companies, and insurance companies.
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Thailand increasingly deregulated and
liberalized access of  foreign firms to its financial sector.  For example, foreign equity
limits were relaxed for ten years to allow foreign ownership of up to 100%
(previously 25%) in commercial banks and finance companies. However, new capital
invested in these companies after the ten-year period must be provided by domestic
investors until foreign-held equity share falls to 49%.  Other restrictions concerning
the number branches foreign banks may operate, as well as limits on the number of
expatriate professionals that can be employed, could also be raised in the
negotiations.  Similarly, in the area of brokerage services,  foreign firms are allowed
to own shares greater than 49% of Thai securities firms only on a case-by-case
basis.29
Thailand’s communications market is characterized by limited competition and
relatively high prices.  While Thailand has committed to open up telecommunications
services to direct foreign competition by January 2006, the reform process has
lagged. Although the Thai Government has allowed foreign participation in the
telecommunications sector since 1989, the market is still dominated by two state-
owned companies: the Communications Authority of Thailand, which controls
international services, and the TOT Corporation and Public Company Limited,
which controls domestic services. A few private sector companies have been awarded
concessions by the Thai government to provide wireless and fixed-line services.
Pending establishment of a National Telecommunications Commission to serve as
an independent regulator, deregulation and full liberalization of the
telecommunications market is likely to be difficult.30
Liberalization of other services such as legal, construction, architecture,
engineering, and accounting are also likely to be U.S. negotiating objectives.  Various
Thai laws currently make it very difficult for foreign-owned companies and  nationals
to operate in these industries.31 
Investment
The United States has an investment agreement with Thailand under the 1966
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (AER).  The treaty accords the same rights
to U.S. and Thai citizens and companies to own and operate in each other’s territory
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with the exception of professional services and several sectors such as
communications, transportation, and depository banking.  
Initially, the AER provided few benefits to U.S. investors because Thailand  at
the time had few laws and regulations restricting foreign investment.  Over time,
however, Thailand instituted new laws and regulations that limited foreign nationals’
operations in Thailand.  As a result, the legal treatment accorded by the 1966 treaty
became preferences extended only to U.S. investors. Consequently, the AER came
to violate Thailand’s WTO obligations to accord equal treatment to all member
states.  Thailand received an exemption from the WTO for ten years, but the
exemption expires in January 2005.
The FTA negotiations may consider ways to construct a bilateral investment
agreement that is WTO-consistent but still retains current privileges for U.S.
companies and nationals. With over 1200  U.S. companies currently taking advantage
of the rights protected by the AER,  the issue could become a top priority for the U.S.
business community.32
U.S. negotiators may also make establishment of a special investor-state dispute
mechanism a priority objective.  Such a mechanism could ensure neutral and binding
third-party resolution of disputes involving foreign investors and the host country.
Thailand’s plans for reforming and privatizing a number of state-owned
companies continues to be a matter of great interest to foreign investors.  The Thai
government’s plan to overhaul state-owned telecommunications, energy, and
transport companies has encountered widespread opposition from labor unions,
causing indefinite delays in planned share offerings of the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand, Thailand’s largest state-owned company.33
Congress and the U.S.-Thailand FTA
The U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations are of interest to Congress because (1) an
agreement would require passage of implementing legislation to become operational;
(2) an agreement could increase U.S. exports of goods, services, and investment; (3)
an agreement could increase competition for U.S. import-competing industries such
as textiles and apparel and pick-up trucks; and (4) if an agreement is implemented,
Thailand would become the second Asian FTA partner (the first was Singapore) for
the United States.  
Under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of the Trade Act of 2002, the
President has the authority to negotiate FTAs that can only be approved or rejected,
not amended, by Congress.  Six bilateral agreements are currently operational(Israel,
NAFTA, Jordan, Chile, Singapore, and Australia).  Negotiations have been
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completed on three others (Bahrain, Dominican Republic-Central America, and
Morocco).  Negotiations are on-going for South African Customs Union, Andean
Community, and Panama..  Additional negotiations are expected to start this year
with Oman and the United Arab Emirates.
Before negotiations for the FTA are launched, the Administration must consult
with the Congressional Oversight Group, the Senate Finance Committee, the House
Ways and Means Committee and other committees with jurisdiction over issues
included in the negotiation.  Additional consultations are required for aspects of the
negotiations relating to agriculture, fisheries, and textiles. 
Many Members of Congress support an aggressive FTA strategy because of the
potential to open foreign markets further to U.S. exports and investment.  While the
Administration’s policy of negotiating multiple FTAs has not been very
controversial, some Members have expressed concerns that the Administration’s
criteria for deciding on FTA partners has relied too heavily on foreign policy
considerations.  In the case of Thailand, however, the same Members welcomed the
announcement of the Thailand FTA because Thailand represents a relatively large
market that offers significant commercial gains, particularly to U.S. agricultural
producers.34 
In support of the negotiations, a U.S.- Thailand Free Trade Agreement Business
Coalition and a congressional caucus were launched on March 23, 2004.  Corporate
co-chairs of the business coalition are FedEx, General Electric, New York Life
International, Time Warner, Qualcomm Inc., and Unocal Corporation. Co-chairs of
the congressional caucus are Representatives Jim Ramstad (R-MN) and William
Jefferson (D-LA) in the House  and Senators Gordon Smith (R-OR) and Max Baucus
(D-MT) in the Senate.
At the same time, some congressional concern has surfaced in regard to
automotive trade, centered on the impact that a reduction of the current 25% U.S.
tariff on pick-up trucks could have on imports and U.S. jobs.  Thailand is the world’s
second largest producer of pick-up trucks, and both Japan and U.S. automakers have
operations there.  
Senators George Voinovich (R-OH) and Carl Levin(D-MI), co-chairs of the
Senate Auto Caucus, in a November 12, 2003 letter, urged  the Bush Administration
to retain the 25% tariff out of concern that its elimination would open the door for
Japan to export trucks from Thailand to the United States.  A similar letter was
signed by the chairs of the House Auto Caucus, Representatives Dale Kildee (D-MI)
and Fred Upton (R-MI).35  On the Senate side, a group of 40 Senators (36 Democrats
and 4 Republicans) sent a similar letter to U.S. trade officials on March 18, 2005.
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A different approach to this concern is embodied in S.Con.Res. 90 introduced
by Senators Levin and Voinovich on February 23, 2004, and H.Con.Res. 366,
introduced February 24, 2004, by Representatives Kildee, Quinn, and Levin. Because
Japan and other countries could benefit from bilateral concessions agreed to between
the United States and Thailand, the resolutions maintain that negotiations affecting
access to the U.S. automotive market should only take place if all major automobile
producing countries participate.  
Other members of Congress may wish to consider how a U.S.-Thai FTA could
affect U.S. commercial relations in Asia in general, particularly in light of the trend
among Asian countries for bilateral trade agreements. China’s growing economic role
in Asia and its quest for new markets, materials, and trade deals is pushing almost
every other major Asian country, including Japan and South Korea, to consider FTAs
with each other.36  Given the increased competition, the U.S.-ASEAN Business
Council  in a recent report calls for a vigorous timetable for the U.S.-Thai FTA talks
and designation of the next ASEAN country with which the United States will seek
an FTA.37 Accordingly, U.S. trade strategy toward the ten-nation ASEAN grouping,
which is the third largest market for U.S. exports, could be an important
congressional consideration. 
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Appendix A.  U.S. Imports from Thailand, Customs Value by
Two-Digit Harmonized System Commodity Codes, 2001-2003
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
HS Commodity Description 2001 2002 2003
Total 14,727.2 14,792.9 15,180.7
85 Electrical Machinery 3,024.4 3,275.7 3,349.9
84 Machinery 2,522.0 2,596.1 2,356.0
71 Precious Stones, Metal 850.5 899.5 1,000.8
61 Knit Apparel 992.3 940.1 900.2
62 Woven Apparel 847.1 807.6 841.9
16 Prepared Meat, Fish, etc. 749.5 758.7 772.9
40 Rubber 555.9 650.8 762.7
03 Fish and Seafood 867.0 587.1 651.7
94 Furniture and Bedding 310.6 398.0 420.0
39 Plastic 201.1 214.6 336.0
90 Optical, Medical Instruments 384.0 367.1 311.0
64 Footwear 314.5 279.8 285.3
95 Toys and Sports Equipment 270.9 254.8 265.2
20 Preserved Food 150.4 163.9 208.1
73 Iron/Steel Products 169.0 178.6 193.6
91 Clocks and Watches 83.2 76.6 165.3
44 Wood 161.0 177.1 160.1
98 Special Other 98.1 109.6 155.3
42 Leather Art; Saddlery; Bags 381.0 233.5 154.0
63 Miscellaneous Textile Articles 137.0 145.4 144.9
10 Cereals 106.5 95.0 132.5
87 Vehicles, Not Railway 97.6 122.1 131.8
69 Ceramic Products 133.3 123.0 128.4
76 Aluminum 144.5 113.9 116.5
99 Other Special Improvement Provisions 111.2 109.6 112.0
25 Salt; Sulfur; Earth, Stone 109.9 119.2 98.2
21 Miscellaneous Food 59.0 71.8 76.9
70 Glass and Glassware 58.3 53.3 63.1
83 Miscellaneous Articles of Base Metal 34.0 43.1 55.5
55 Manmade Staple Fibers 53.3 60.8 53.6
52 Cotton and Yarn, Fabric 71.7 71.2 49.0
19 Baking Related 32.5 39.6 47.7
72 Iron and Steel 30.0 58.9 42.5
48 Paper, Paperboard 31.7 34.9 38.0
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HS Commodity Description 2001 2002 2003
27 Mineral Fuel, Oil, etc. 84.6 25.8 37.2
74 Copper and Articles Thereof 38.2 36.6 34.2
23 Food Waste; Animal Feed 22.4 25.8 33.8
96 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 35.9 35.5 33.7
17 Sugars 30.4 21.3 29.4
22 Beverages 16.7 24.1 29.3
08 Edible Fruit and Nuts 19.4 20.0 26.2
34 Soap, Wax, etc; Dental Preparations 19.5 21.4 24.8
24 Tobacco 25.4 14.6 23.9
49 Books, Newspapers; Manuscripts 22.5 21.7 23.5
54 Manmade Filament, Fabric 29.7 27.1 22.9
67 Artificial Flowers, Feathers 29.0 23.7 22.1
32 Tanning, Dye, Paint, Putty 18.1 18.0 17.2
05 Other of Animal Origin 22.9 21.0 16.8
33 Perfumery, Cosmetic, etc. 8.9 8.9 15.8
82 Tool, Cutlery, of Base Metals 7.9 9.5 15.3
41 Hides and Skins 12.0 13.1 13.2
68 Stone, Plaster, Cement, etc. 11.0 16.1 13.1
57 Textile Floor Covering 11.2 11.2 11.3
56 Wadding, Felt, Twine, Rope 9.1 9.2 10.0
06 Live Trees and Plants 8.1 7.5 9.2
58 Special Woven Fabric, etc. 7.8 9.5 8.6
30 Pharmaceutical Products 2.0 3.7 8.6
38 Miscellaneous Chemical Products 7.1 7.9 8.3
59 Impregnated Textile Fabrics 7.0 7.5 8.2
92 Musical Instruments 7.5 8.2 7.9
09 Spices, Coffee, and Tea 15.6 4.4 7.8
35 Albumins; Mod Starch; Glue 7.9 8.6 7.6
11 Milling; Malt; Starch 7.1 7.9 7.5
65 Headgear 6.1 5.7 6.4
18 Cocoa 2.8 5.5 6.3
13 Lac; Vegetable Sap; Extract 5.2 3.0 6.3
29 Organic Chemicals 6.6 5.6 6.2
12 Miscellaneous Grain, Seed, Fruit 6.8 6.8 5.9
60 Knit, Crocheted Fabric 9.5 7.0 5.7
81 Other Base Metals, etc. 16.4 8.7 5.0
50 Silk; Silk Yarn, Fabric 5.8 5.1 4.7
28 Inorganic Chemicals; Rare Earth 0.9 15.5 4.4
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66 Umbrella, Walking-sticks, etc. 6.6 4.9 4.0
07 Vegetables 5.0 5.6 3.1
97 Art and Antiques 3.3 3.5 2.9
04 Dairy, Eggs, Honey, etc. 2.0 6.0 2.7
46 Straw, Esparto 1.5 1.6 1.9
14 Other Vegetable 0.6 0.6 1.3
88 Aircraft, Spacecraft 1.7 1.1 1.0
15 Fats and Oils 0.7 0.8 0.9
80 Tin and Articles Thereof 1.0 1.0 0.9
36 Explosives 0.08 0.9 0.9
26 Ores, Slag, Ash 0.7 0.5 0.8
86 Railway; Traffic Sign Equipment 0.4 0.2 0.4
01 Live Animals 0.1 0.04 0.3
37 Photographic/Cinematographic 0.5 0.3 0.2
53 Other Vegetable Textile Fiber 0.2 0.4 0.2
79 Zinc and Articles Thereof 0.02 0.1 0.2
51 Animal Hair and Yarn, Fabric 0.02 0.04 0.05
75 Nickel and Articles Thereof 0.09 0.08 0.04
47 Wood Pulp, etc. 0.2 0.1 0.03
45 Cork 0.1 0.1 0.03
89 Ships and Boats 1.5 1.0 0.03
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Appendix B.  U.S. Exports to Thailand by Two-Digit Harmonized
System Commodity Codes, 2001-2003
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
HS Commodity Description 2001 2002 2003
Total 5,989.4 4,860.2 5,841.7
85 Electrical Machinery 1,957.8 1,332.1 1,319.4
84 Machinery 1,001.3 921.3 1,089.0
88 Aircraft, Spacecraft 560.7 231.9 782.1
90 Optical, Medical Instruments 208.5 190.1 226.4
39 Plastic 174.7 194.1 210.6
12 Miscellaneous Grain, Seed, Fruit 131.5 116.6 183.9
29 Organic Chemicals 161.8 150.3 177.0
71 Precious Stones, Medals; Coins 111.5 144.3 174.0
52 Cotton and Yarn, Fabric 106.1 126.4 157.1
98 Special Other 149.2 130.0 136.4
72 Iron and Steel 6.8 28.4 97.0
23 Food Waste; Animal Feed 93.9 101.3 78.5
38 Miscellaneous Chemical Products 96.5 97.5 75.0
41 Hides and Skins 72.6 60.3 70.0
47 Wood Pulp, etc. 51.6 63.8 69.7
33 Perfumery, Cosmetic, etc. 35.9 47.0 63.0
31 Fertilizers 57.7 40.5 56.5
10 Cereals 57.7 63.8 55.6
87 Vehicles, Not Railway 143.9 57.5 49.3
70 Glass and Glassware 131.2 75.0 44.4
28 Inorganic Chemicals; Rare Earth 48.2 41.5 43.8
27 Mineral Fuel, Oil, etc. 53.4 39.4 39.6
73 Iron/Steel Products 27.6 28.2 39.2
48 Paper, Paperboard 48.5 54.4 37.5
30 Pharmaceutical Products 45.3 35.9 37.0
32 Tanning, Dye, Paint, Putty 23.8 28.3 34.0
03 Fish and Seafood 23.0 22.0 33.7
56 Wadding, Felt, Twine, Rope 3.9 7.6 32.3
34 Soap, Wax, etc.; Dental Preparations 25.5 28.0 30.5
40 Rubber 21.7 23.5 30.3
44 Wood 25.1 31.4 26.7
76 Aluminum 41.1 31.3 26.5
21 Miscellaneous Food 12.8 19.0 25.3
16 Prepared Meat, Fish, etc. 11.9 12.6 17.0
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20 Preserved Food 15.4 17.1 16.8
08 Edible Fruit and Nuts 11.4 12.1 16.2
49 Book and Newspaper; Manuscripts 8.7 12.3 15.9
54 Manmade Filament, Fabric 10.9 13.0 15.5
25 Salt; Sulfur; Earth, Stone 15.9 15.0 13.2
95 Toys and Sports Equipment 11.9 15.8 12.6
35 Albumins; Mod Starch; Glue 9.7 12.5 12.3
24 Tobacco 23.1 22.1 11.7
94 Furniture and Bedding 13.1 9.5 11.5
82 Tool, Cutlery, of Base Metals 12.3 12.5 10.3
13 Lac; Vegetable Sap; Extract 8.6 8.2 10.0
04 Dairy, Eggs, Honey, etc. 10.0 17.3 8.8
83 Miscellaneous Articles of Base Metals 6.9 8.0 8.1
01 Live Animals 4.5 7.5 8.0
17 Sugars 4.6 7.3 7.0
68 Stone, Plaster, Cement, etc. 4.6 7.0 6.2
74 Cooper and Articles Thereof 4.9 6.2 6.1
96 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 7.8 8.3 5.7
59 Impregnated Textile Fabrics 6.5 5.3 5.5
93 Arms and Ammunition 8.1 4.8 5.3
64 Footwear 4.6 3.8 5.2
55 Manmade Staple Fibers 5.8 4.5 4.4
18 Cocoa 1.0 4.0 4.0
69 Ceramic Products 2.4 2.4 3.8
81 Other Base Metals, etc. 3.8 0.7 3.4
37 Photographic/Cinematographic 2.6 4.0 3.2
19 Baking Related 4.0 3.3 3.2
02 Meat 2.5 2.8 3.0
36 Explosives 2.3 2.8 3.0
60 Knit, Crocheted Fabric 1.7 2.8 2.6
61 Knit Apparel 0.8 0.8 2.5
89 Ships and Boats 0.2 0.6 2.5
92 Musical Instruments 1.8 2.0 2.4
22 Beverages 2.5 3.3 2.2
15 Fats and Oils 1.6 1.4 2.2
63 Miscellaneous Textile Articles 1.8 2.6 2.0
05 Other of Animal Origin 4.9 6.6 1.9
07 Vegetables 1.1 1.3 1.6
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42 Leather Art; Saddlery; Bags 1.7 1.0 1.6
75 Nickel and Articles Thereof 0.9 0.7 1.5
86 Railway; Traffic Sign Equipment 9.0 1.8 1.5
57 Textile Floor Covering 0.7 0.6 1.4
09 Spices, Coffee, and Tea 1.0 1.0 1.2
58 Special Woven Fabric, etc. 2.5 2.8 1.2
62 Woven Apparel 1.0 0.7 1.0
26 Ores, Slag, Ash 0.3 0.6 0.9
11 Milling; Malt; Starch 2.5 1.0 0.6
51 Animal Hair and Yarn; Fabric 0.9 0.7 0.5
97 Art and Antiques 0.7 0.2 0.3
45 Cork 0.02 0.03 0.3
91 Clocks and Watches 0.4 0.4 0.3
65 Headgear 0.3 0.2 0.2
78 Lead 0.1 0.3 0.2
46 Straw, Esparto 0.05 0.08 0.1
43 Fur Skin and Artificial Fur 0.06 0.04 0.09
06 Live Trees and Plants 0.004 0.02 0.08
79 Zinc and Articles Thereof 0.04 0.02 0.06
80 Tin and Articles Thereof 0.2 0.1 0.05
67 Artificial Flowers, Feathers 0.008 0.06 0.04
